It always intrigues me as to which battles have drawn popular attention during the sesquicentennial. We’ve heard virtually nothing, for example,of Grant’s failed effort to take Vicksburg in December 1862. The Union commander had proposed a two-pronged offensive, with Grant directing a drive down central Mississippi while William T. Sherman led a riverborne thrust at Vicksburg itself from the north. Whatever the merits of the plan, its hurried implementation owed something to the concern both generals had about the imminent appearance of John A. McClernand, who carried orders that he believed gave him independent command of an expedition against Vicksburg. That this was not quite the case is a story left for another time.
The offensive met with dismal results. Confederate raids against Grant’s supply line, notably the capture of a supply depot at Holly Springs, forced Grant to turn back, although he later said that during the retreat he learned much about living off the land, an experience that would prove useful later. This setback allowed the Confederates at Vicksburg to concentrate on stopping Sherman, a task that proved none too difficult. Part of this was due to the terrain along which the Confederates deployed, a series of bluffs and hills that made Marye’s Heights and the sunken road west of Fredericksburg seem like a mere wrinkle in the ground. But the failure of the Union assault at significant cost also owed much to Sherman’s unimaginative handling of the attack, a trait that he repeatedly displayed throughout the war when it came to assaults upon defensive positions. “We will lose 5,000 men before we take Vicksburg, and may as well lose them here as anywhere else,” he observed, a comment that reflects his readiness to accept losses and his uninspired approach to offensive operations. In fact, Sherman lost 1,176 men, while the Confederates lost a mere 187 men. As Sherman later summed it up in a dispatch to Halleck, ”I reached Vicksburg at the time appointed, landed, assaulted, and failed.” Given both the strength of the Confederate position and Sherman’s approach to launching assaults, it is hard to imagine any other outcome.
The failure of Grant’s first attempt to take Vicksburg reflected the confused nature of Union command relationships at this point in the war. Lincoln had approved three major command changes that fall: Burnside had replaced McClellan, Rosecrans had replaced Buell, and McClernand had wrangled a command independent of Grant, or so he thought. Politics were part of all three command changes: the command structure erected in July 1862 with the appointment of Henry W. Halleck was a wreck. Grant struggled to find out about McClernand’s mission, and moved when he did in part because he had no faith in McClernand’s ability to succeed … and yet it is reasonable to add that if McClernand triumphed, it would come at Grant’s expense, and Grant knew this, too. During the months to come commanders would find themselves having to deal with disloyal subordinates who were all too free with sharing their opinions with the powers that be back at state capitals and Washington, with Lincoln himself avidly listening to such reports. Given his own masterful handling of his cabinet crisis, one wonders why he would promote instability in several army commands. Of the three major commanders in place in December 1862, only one would survive such internal intrigue and be in place a year later. That Ulysses S. Grant prevailed given the obstacles in front of him … and the fire in his rear … remains one of the most interesting and revealing tales in American history.
The Vicksburg National Military Park hosted a seminar last night at the visitor center, and a free Chickasaw Bayou tour this morning led by Terry Winschel.
Just some observations:
1) Grant’s withdrawal may have allowed Pemberton to concentrate against Sherman, if Sherman had stuck around a little while longer. As it was, the only units from Grenada that participated in the battle were ordered south before Pemberton realized Grant was withdrawing. These two units were Gregg’s brigade, which sat in reserve, and Vaughn’s diminuitive brigade of raw conscripts, which skirmished lightly in an area Sherman did not assault.
2) Halleck had already ordered Grant to end his overland campaign 15 days before the battle, in favor of sending as large a portion of his army down the river as could be carried on the transports at hand. Grant appeared to have plans to meet up with Sherman that were wholly dependent on Pemberton withdrawing his entire army south after Sherman captured Vicksburg. If Grant and Sherman had truly planned on any cooperation, Grant had ample time (9 days?) to get a courier to Sherman to call off the assault but Grant’s withdrawal wasn’t communicated to Sherman until McClernand arrived and took command. Grant was clearly unconcerned about the cooperation that is alleged to have been planned between the two. While Van Dorn’s raid destroyed valuable foodstuffs and cotton, strategically all it really did was expedite Grant’s eventual move to Milliken’s Bend with his entire force.
3) Grant’s assertion that he learned he could live off the land appears overblown. When Halleck ordered the bulk of Grant’s army to return to Memphis and strike down the river, Grant called Sherman to HQ to discuss two remaining options: obey the order, or break free from his supply line and march rapidly to Jackson, bypassing the defenses at Grenada. Obviously Grant already felt confident enough in his ability to live off the land to seriously consider this second option at the risk of disobeying Halleck’s order.
4) This area is ripe for battlefield restoration, most of the geographical features still exist with the notable exception of Fishing Lake (where Sherman attempted to place the pontoon bridge). The lake has been filled in and plowed over. Strangely enough, the Indian Mound was still intact and undeveloped until about 5 years ago, when a huge ugly quanset hut was built on top of it. *shudder* Kinda curious why nobody has lobbied congress to add Chickasaw Bayou / Snyder’s Bluff / Drumgould’s Bluff to the VNMP now that the VNMP charter includes this period.
5) The battlefield is home to a semi-famous piece of folk art, in a community (Kings) founded by freed slaves … although the man responsible for building this thing recently passed away and it is beginning to fall into disrepair. http://www.roadsideamerica.com/tip/6748
6) You’re just throwing me a bone, aren’t you?
Could be. I’m not sure I’d accept all your observations, although I think Grant did not need the retreat to teach him the lesson of living off the land so much as the retreat provided a good demonstration of it.
Which observations did you have in mind? Thought maybe I screwed up the timing of Vaugh / Gregg / Pemberton learning of Grant’s withdrawal from his front, but I dusted off my notes:
December 23rd: Vaughn ordered to Vicksburg.
December 24th: Gregg ordered to Vicksburg.
December 25th: Pemberton receives news of Grant withdrawing from his front and burning bridges behind him.
I guess that leaves Grant’s plans to cooperate with Sherman?
Pemberton receiving the news on December 25 means he doesn’t have to worry about Grant afterwards. It really has nothing to do with the shifting of forces, because Sherman posed the bigger threat at the time of the shifting.
The problem with relying on the written record when there are also conversations is that what’s said isn’t always what’s written. We tend to treat correspondence as conversation, and then say that if there’s nothing in the correspondence, it’s not said … but Sherman mentions cooperating with Grant in a letter to his brother written January 6.
My point was that the “cooperation” described by Sherman in his letter to John, Grant following Pemberton with his flank on the Yazoo so that he can be supplied by Sherman, is wholly dependent on Sherman’s success at Vicksburg. At this point, Sherman not being privvy to Pemberton’s orders, Sherman is convinced that Grant’s withdrawal has prompted Pemberton to concentrate against him prior to the asault, but the only two brigades involved at Chickasaw Bayou from Grenada were ordered away prior to Pemberton’s realization that Grant was withdrawing.
Grant, having already stated that he does not have the men needed to push any farther south on his own, is not planning to push Pemberton unless Pemberton flees. But at the time of Grant’s withdrawal, the only units Pemberton has queued to reinforce Vicksburg were the remainder of Maury’s division.
So Grant has orders to withdraw to the Memphis-to-Corinth line, McPherson is pushing him to travel to Sherman and take command on the river, Sherman is doomed to fail, and Grant is about to learn that McClernand has taken the bulk of his army off into Arkansas. Grant’s eventual decision is clear: transfer his army to the river and take command. I’m just pointing out that ultimately all Van Dorn achieved is to expedite Grant’s arrival at Milliken’s Bend.
Some responses to your observations:
1) Sherman did stick around. On Jan2 he was still floundering around after spending a few days trying to come up with a new assault plan.
2) I’m not sure what order from Halleck you are referring to; your description doesn’t match any that I am aware of. Anyway, Sherman expected cooperation from Grant, as that was what Grant expressed in his orders to him. That Grant didn’t implement his side of the plan doesn’t negate that this was the plan. I don’t think it would be quite as easy to get a courier to Sherman as you suggest and Forrest cutting Grant’s communication had a significant impact in delaying him from communicating with Sherman, or with anyone else. I think that Van Dorn is given too much credit compared to Forrest for their impact on Grant.
Halleck told Grant multiple times to withdraw back to the Memphis-to-Corinth line and send as many men down the river as could be carried on transports, the last was December 5th, 15 days prior to the Holly Springs fiasco. Grant called Sherman to his HQ to discuss two options, follow Halleck’s instructions or break free of his supply line and march on Jackson. Grant appears to be fixated on an earlier Halleck message telling him he has permission to fight the enemy where he pleases. But Sherman appears to have talked some sense into Grant; Lincoln’s directive by fiat through Halleck to send the bulk of the army down the river constituted as direct an order as could be expected out of Halleck and it would be unwise to disobey,
At this point, Grant’s overland campaign is terminated, in favor of Lincoln / Halleck / McClernand’s riverine direct assault.
Not sure why it would be difficult to get a courier to Sherman. Oxford is only 80 miles overland, an escorted courier could have gotten there in three days, add two days to travel down river and a courier still gets there several days before Sherman’s assault. But Grant was remarkably unconcerned about Sherman’s fate, which seems to support Sherman’s suggestion that cooperation with Grant (meeting Grant on the Yazoo) was contingent upon Sherman’s success at Vicksburg.
When you wrote “15 days before the battle” I thought you meant December 14th, 15 days before Chickasaw Bayou. I see your point about a courier and Grant’s lack of attention to notifying Sherman when the plan changed.
You wrote that “Lincoln had approved three major command changes that fall”. I feel that there was a fourth: Banks replacing Butler. This command change was connected with the Grant-McClernand-Sherman dynamic in that Banks’ mission was a part of the effort to clear the Mississippi.
Well, given the 1862 records of the army commanders who Burnside and Rosecrans replaced, is it unreasonable to suggest that they were not necessary?
The issue of McClernands’s command is, as you say, complex, but doesn’t it tie into the “300,000 more” recruiting call?
The concept of giving a commander “two bites” is a reasonable one, but it seems that McClellan had more than that – the Peninsula generally, the Seven Days, and his decisions after Antietam, and the results of the above three, all seem to have given him more than enough opportunity to distinguish himself.
Buell seems to have gotten close to the same; maybe a little less forbearance from the NCA, but not that much less.
“To encourage the others” is a completely legitimate leadership practice, when necessary; Tom Ricks makes a pretty reasonable case it is one that should be resurrected in the AUS.
Best,
I’m simply pointing out that Grant was something of a survivor. Neither Rosecrans nor Burnside held on to their commands.
Lincoln rarely deposed someone right after a defeat (McDowell stands out in this regard). The pattern appeared to be failure, followed by a second chance, followed by a flare-up. Even Pope was still around for several days after Second Manassas.
That’s an interesting observation – fair points. Also interesting that while neither Burnside or Rosecrans or Pope kept their army level commands, all three hung on in lesser posts – as did others (McDowell and Hooker, for example).
Which is not unique; even Fredendall got a training command in the US after Kasserine Pass.
McCllellan, however, was shelved. Interesting comparison with Short in WW II.
And compare Short’s fate with that of Dugout Doug, despite the absolute debacle which took place on December 8 at Clark Field after hours of forewarning.
There is that…
All kidding aside, I always thought the best assignment for MacArthur after the summer-fall of 1942 would have been Chungking; after Midway, there was no real threat to the SoWesPac area, and presumably Blamey could have managed the Papua defensive campaign, and then stood on the defensive for the rest of the war.
Sendng MacArthur to th CBI would have given both Wavell and Chiang someone who could do “imperious” with the best of them, freed up Stilwell for the ETO and Halsey/Vandegrift et al for the Central Pacific, and would have answered the China Lobby, all in one fell swoop – by the time Mac understood what a backwater it was, the Allies could have been ashore in NW Europe and closing on Japan, especially sans the SWP and SoPac offensives…
Best,
Well, that’s an extremely interesting angle I’d never thought of (and nobody who matriculated on the playing fields of Eton could have out-bloviated MacArthur, “stygean darkness” and all – hell, I don’t think Johnny Burgoyne could have done it 150 or so years earlier). The whole New Guinea/SW Pacific campaign was a bloody, unnecessary sop to MacArthur’s boundless ego. Other than the virtual certainty that the Burma Road would have been the MacArthur Road, there wasn’t much real harm his preening could have accomplished in the CBI. I doubt that anybody in US military history had a reputation more out of whack with actual accomplishments than Dugout Doug. As Ike supposedly said…….
You know, between December, 1941; June, 1950; and October, 1950, MacArthur certainly had his three bites.
After the Australians stopped the IJA at Imita Ridge, and the Australians and Americans won at Milne Bay, there was nothing else necessary to do in SoWesPac but stand on the defensive; a better prepared counter-offensive to Buna-Gona by the US and Lae-Salamaua in 1943 (rather than the half-cocked ones that began in 1942) would have been sufficient to completely secure Papua and move into NE New Guinea to keep the Japanese occupied, but that was it…the remainder of New Guinea, the Solomons, and New Britain-New Ireland could have been isolated by air and sea, with the US forces in the theater moving by sea northabout to into Micronesia after the Central Pacific campaign kicked off in 1943, and the Australians (with Blamey as theater C-in-C, presumably) could have been the Japanese forces left behind contained.
MacArthur and Chiang would have been a match made in heaven, and it would have kept the China Lobby in hand; and I always thought Stilwell, given his WW I experience, would have been a great choice for a major role in North Africa and southern France. If Stilwell got the II Corps (rather than Fredendall) I don’t see Kasserine happening – and he would have been a good choice for 5th Army and/or 7th Army and then 6th AG as the war progressed, which in turn frees up Devers (or Patton) for the 1st Army and then 12th AG in NW Europe..
Of course, Madame Chiang might have been an effective “liaison”, although that could have required Dugout to dump the Filipino female accompaniment he was used to.
I agree on the points about Stillwell. In hindsight, given the objectives and needs in the CBI as opposed to other theaters, that looks like the wrong assignment.
In a lot of ways, I think MacArthur deserved the “19th Century man in the 20th Century” tag that sometimes fell on Patton; as much of a romantic that Patton was at times, he was very much a technologist.
MacArthur seems to have dropped into the 20th Century from a different era entirely, at times.
Of course, as you suggest, GSP was able to separate his “19th century self” from his “20th century self” – hence his ability to combine older notions of martial “audacity” with an early appreciation of what could be achieved by modern mechanized warfare and air support. In that sense he was far, far from stuck in the 19th century. MacArthur? I think he was stuck in the image of the 19th century without a whole lot more – although he did know how to make a lot of money out of his pre-war assignment in the Philippines and his cozy (and very lucrative) relationship with Quezon. (Note that Eisenhower turned down a similar cash bonanza from the Philippines). Mac wasn’t sufficiently 19th century to turn down a Congressional MOH for his WWII service despite no demonstration of actual battlefield valor. .
“The whole New Guinea/SW Pacific campaign was a bloody, unnecessary sop to MacArthur’s boundless ego.”
So I guess Marshall FDR and the JCS are to blame then since they were his bosses and ordered him to fight there.
Well, as I’m sure you know or you wouldn’t be posting on this topic, Mac did an awful lot of negotiating to get that one. I’m not going to say it was based entirely on Dugout’s problem with Nimitz and the USN coming off as heroes or his need to be photographed returning to the place where he scored a large bank account, but those were not “irrelevant”, either. Got anything to say about December 8? Just because a guy looks like a general with the pipe, the shades, and the rakish hat doesn’t mean that he is one.
He was the GOP’s favorite general officer; there was a lot going on in terms of his assignments that would not have occurred absent a great deal of politicking, both directly by MacArthur and on his behalf.
Realistically, after Midway, the only strategic weapon the Japanese had when the war began was essentially destroyed; standing on the defensive in the SoWesPac, where the US had never planned on fighting prior to ARCADIA, would not have hurt the Allied effort and certainly did not justify building up what amounted to an “American” (as opposed to Allied) theater in 1943-44, with all the shipping and logistics necessary to sustain such…
The Australians had the capability of defending their own shores with US naval and air support, and defending Papua and NE New Guinea with a limited (1942-43) commitment of US ground forces; anything beyond that was overkill.
Where I fault Marshall is in his willingness to accede to Dugout’s demands (although to be fair he and FDR had to deal with Dugout’s not insignificant political clout at home – dating back to his enthusiastic burning of the Bonus Army encampment). Marshall first fell into this when he acceded to MacArthur’s demand for a large contingent of B-17′s in late summer/early fall, 1941 even though MacArthur lacked sufficient anti aircratf protection, sufficient fighters to protect the bombers, enough camouflage paint, and a sufficient number of dispersal fields to safely accommodate the B-17′s rather than setting up a couple of large, vulnerable parking lots. This was all based on MacArthur’s (wrong) prognostication that the Japanese would be unable to do anything offensively until summer, 1942 – based on God knows what (and foreshadowing his equally foolish guarantee to Truman in 1950 about Chinese intervention in Korea). The rest was on Dugout alone (and those he supervised) – including failure to construct blast pits at Clark and refusal to authorize recon flights as far as Formosa – and, of course, sleeping on the several hours of forewarning after the Pearl Harbor attack.
MacArthur wasn’t responsible for 18 B-17s and few P-40s being caught on the ground on December 8th. Poor old Mac, little did he know liberal Democrats and Foreigners would be hating his guts almost 60 years after his death.
That seems over the top, don’t you think?
He was – for lack of a better term – the theater commander in the Western Pacific in December, 1941, with complete authority over the Army Air Force command; if Brereton did not measure up (and the record is, to be charitable, “mixed” on who asked to do what in early December, including Dec. 8) then it was MacArthur’s responsibility to ensure the air force was functioning.
He did not do so.
Combine that with his decision-making in 1942 with regards to the Buna-Gona offensive, and then both times where he made the wrong call in 1950, and his record seems open to criticism.
Best,
Oh really? Brereton was his subordinate. Of course, given that Dugout chose to sleep in despite the Pearl Harbor news, that left it up to Brereton to take authority to do something that should have been planned long before. Brereton wasn’t the guy who demanded planes that he couldn’t defend or disperse, wasn’t the guy who had ultimate authority to order recon as far as Formosa, and wasn’t the guy who assured Washington that the Japanese would have no offensive capability until mid-1942. Those are facts. You apparently lack those and need to resort to (erroneous, by the way) labels.
Remember … there was talk of bringing McClellan back in 1864, perhaps to command the defenses of Washington (rich irony there). No formal offer was ever made: in the case of Don Carlos Buell, it was Buell who turned down a chance to return to the field.
Wasnt there even talk of bringing back McClellan in ’63?
Talk, yes … but not much beyond that. The 1864 initiative was much more serious.
Seems like McClellan would have made a decent replacement for Lorenzo Thomas as AG; his talents seem much more as a trainer and organizer than in field operations.
Or, all kidding aside, given his European experience, maybe a diplomatic post?
Adams seems to have had the London mission well in hand; France, maybe, to hep ease the Empire out of the Mexican misadventure? Or Prussia?
Japan in the aftermath of Shimonoseki?
I believe there were informal feelers put out to McClellan offering him a command in ’64 in exchange for a promise not to run for POTUS. Others state that McClellan was convinced he was going to be sent West after Antietam. Its too bad McClellan’s considerable couldn’t have been put to good use somewhere other than the AoP. Unfortunately, given the hatred Stanton, Chase, and others had for him that wasn’t possible.
I’m ssure you’re correct; I guess the question is where would a senior MG have been necessary or useful in 1864, and I don’t see any field commands. Grant/Sherman were the obvious team, east and west.
Hence my thought that a diplomatic post might have been appropriate; did he speak French? Many educated men of the day did, at least in a limited way.
Was his manual of bayonet execises in part translated from the French? I don’t recall offhand.
Well, he had gone on the Crimean tour – presumably that would have been less rewarding if he could not speak with the Allied power that had the largest army in the field.
The other members were Delafield and Alfred Mordecai; presumably one or more of the trio spoke French.
John – Replying down here to the SWP points because of the stretched thread.
I don’t think we disagree on MacArthur overall; as far as Marshall’s decision re reinforcements for the Phillipine command in 1941, I’ll give him credit for supporting the man on the scene and for thinking air power on Luzon might be enough to bluff the Japanese into remaining on the sidelines; same sort of thinking was led to the Pacific Fleet remaining in Hawaii as a deterrent.
Given the stakes in the ETO and the desire to deal with the German threat first, I can see both decisions as being within a rational cost/benefit and correlation of forces.
I suppose the real failure was the inability to understand the Japanese were not going to be deterred in 1941, period.
We agree here, as well, at least to the extent that my criticism of Marshall is muted He was entitled to rely on the assessments of the guy on the scene. The real flaw was MacArthur’s – once you’ve got what you requested you need to take whatever steps you can to protect it. There is an overwhelming stench of arrogance about the way in whuich things were handled in the Philippines as 1941 progressed, culminating with the inexcusable omissions on December 8. As i’ve said before, had things been done competently that almost certainly could not have changed the end result but it could well have caused significant problems for the Japanese timeline, with ripple effects. I’ve always thought that the deadliest collaboration for the Allies in WWII would have been Churchill and MacArthur. Thank God they never got together to scheme. .
LOL…but very fair points re MacArthur and the Dec. 8 debacle.
Good counterpoint on GSP. Despite the romanticism, at heart I think he was much more of a realist about his profession than MacArthur. MacArthur seems to have hit his high point in WW I, in terms of being a combat commander. His service as CoS in the 1930s seems capable, but his inability to create a truly combined and joint command in the SWP in 1942-45 puts him a generation behind in a lot of ways. His leadership of the PA and USAFFE was poor. He did well with the Occupation, but failed twice as a theater commander in 1950 – which, as you point out, has a strong echo of his failures as such in 1941-42 in the Philippines.
GSP did well working with the USN in TORCH, and managed the Morroccan military governorship and relations with the French fairly well (albeit in a very limited arena); better than MacArthur did leading a coalition force with the Australians, I think. I think GSP’s leadership of a corps in Tunisia and armies in Sicily and NW Europe was outstanding tactically, all in all; the hospital incidents were horrible, but in the hard light of day, they were forgivable – general officers suffer from PTSD as much as enlisted men.