… or is it really Stone’s River? Maybe I should have gone with Murfressboro.
Here it is Stone River. Someday, after all this talk about fiscal cliffs and debt ceilings is gone (which will be never), we need to convene a panel that decides on these names once and for all, which will be a lasting contribution of the sesquicentennial.
Normally, I’d have something really, really important and interesting to say about this battle. However, as it involved both William S. Rosecrans and George H. Thomas, both of whom have active fan clubs where some of the members are convinced that people who write about Grant or Sherman have something against Old Rosey and Slow Trot, I feel it is important to reaffirm their prejudices and say that this battle was much ado about very little. Certainly critics of Grant and Sherman at Shiloh will have to explain why Rosecrans allowed himself to be pushed back as far as he was on December 31, and the action of January 2, much like the battle on April 7, has received far less attention that the first day of both of these battles. At best this is another one of those battles that could have been more important (as in dealing Rosecrans a major defeat), but was not. That’s why it reminds me of Shiloh: a bloody engagement where the couldas and shouldas make it more important, and where a Union general held his ground under fire, even as people died around him.
Yes, I know: after the failures at Fredericksburg and Vicksburg, anything other than a bloody setback was good news to some people. After all, I can remember how as a fan of the 1972-73 Islanders I welcomed a tie as an improvement on some sixty losses. But is that the best case that can be made for this battle? You tell me.
First, I knew that you’d come through (although the diversion to the Monitor had me awake
) Let me take a stab at this. Stones River was a victory in much the same way that Antietam was – tactically you’d call it a draw, but so was Antietam and both turned into “wins” because the Rebel armies retreated from the field. Old Abe thought of each as a “win” – I suppose primarily because each was timed to coincide with one of his emancipation edicts and each was sufficient to give the proclamation some military muscle. In addition, each followed close on the heels of a Union debacle (2 BR, Fredericksburg). As for the battle itself, the weather was perhaps the worst for any major battle in the war – freezing rain, roads turned to muck, and a problematic rain-fed river in the middle of the battlefield. Rosy had almost as difficult a “coaching” problem as Bragg – McCook and Crittenden were mediocre on their best days and Thomas was a guy who thought he should have been given the “coaching” position instead of the guy who actually got it. You’re correct about the lack of attention paid to Day 2 but I’d differentiate it from Shiloh in that the fighting on Day 2 was really one geographically limited event – the foolish assault on the Union left and Mendenhall’s massive assemblage of guns. Shiloh Day 2 at least featured a broader swath of units and (for awhile, anyway) more complex fighting. As to the results of the 12/31 AM Confederate attack, as we know, Rosecrans was planning the mirror image of Bragg’s assault – his left against Bragg’s right. Bragg beat him to the punch with the added advantage of facing a corps commander who was described by one colleague as “deficient in the upper story”. Now as for the two “off days” – December 30 and January 1 – I have no good rationale….
December 30 was a day waiting for the trains to come up and fending off serious attacks on them by large units of CS Cavalry operating well behind the Union front.
January 1 was an absolutely miserable day. One diarist says it rained so hard that the fires in their trenches kept going out from the rising water. It was awfully cold, too…probably somewhere in the upper 30s. And there was constant sniping across the lines, most of it directed in and out of the ‘Round Forest’.
Really too bad that not much of this Battlefield is left.
Still, it is well worth the visit.
In the end, the Union troops went into winter camp at Murfreesboro after Bragg’s retreat, building low log walls and pitching tents on top, and each provided with a stove. Tennessee was pretty much then occupied by the Union Army and Navy.
Casualties (dead, wounded, and missing) were roughly 13,000 on the US side and 12,000 among the CSA, and about even in terms of the percentages of those on the field (respectively) – but given the much larger manpower reserves for the US, that combined with Bragg’s withdrawal seems like a win on points.
It pretty much eliminated any further serious threat to US control of middle Tennessee and enhanced the disfunction in the CSA command in the Army of Tennessee – so, all in all, positive outcomes for the loyalist cause and negatives for the treasonous side.
Showed the advantages of the defensive yet again for anyone watching, but that lesson seems to have required 1914-18 to have really sunk in for all and sundry.
Rosecrans presumably “should” have done better, given his manpower advantage and defensive stance, but given his weaknesses as an army commander, probably about the best to be expected. Interestingly enough, McCook kept his corps command, but I expect he was marked…
Best,
One should also not underestimate the impact on foreign relations. I’m not sold at all that the British would ever have intervened and even Napoleon would have been very reluctant to pull that trigger. That said, Antietam certainly helped tip the balance, followed promptly by the initial proclamation. But it wasn’t as though the European question was 100% killed off by those events. In fact, many in Europe saw the initial proclamation as just another desperate war measure. A Confederate takeover of middle Tennessee might still have stirred some embers or kept things in play on the heels of the disaster on the Rappahannock. It didn’t happen because of the Antietam-like “victory” at Stones River, coupled with the issuance of the final proclamation.
True enough.
One thing to keep in mind is that in the 1860s, the European powers were still actively intervening in the Americas; along with the French in Mexico, the Spanish actually retook Santo Domingo, and they initiated the 1866 conflict with Peru and Chile.
That sort of willingness seems to have faded in the 1870s and 1880s, but the Germans tried again in the 1890s (Venezuela), and one could argue it was only the build-up of the USN in the same decade that prevented further adventures by the rising European powers.
Yep. I note that your accounts of intervention leave out our friends in Britain – one of the reasons I’ve never believed that they realistically would ever have done so unless literally forced (such as the Trent affair or a US response to incursions by CSA agents from present-day Ontario). Napoleon had his frolic in Mexico but that was a proposition which was fundamentally different from getting involved in the ACW. Nonetheless, there was good reason to dampen any lingering attractions and Stones River probably did that.
The British were part of the initial blockade coalition against Mexico in 1860, and against Venezuela in the 1890s, however…but granted, I think given their experience in 1775-83 and 1812-15, I doubt the ever would have put an expeditionary force into the field absent a much nastier “Trent Affair” or something similar.
The fact they were less than a decade out from the Crimea AND the Mutiny, and were actually engaged in shooting wars in China and New Zealand in the 1860s presumably would have limited whatever they could commit to North America, if it had gotten “hot”…
The British element in the Crimea never numbered more than 30,000, IIRC, and I’d expect that to put the equivalent into North America in a “cold” war would have been challenging for them in 1861-62…
I should have been clear that I meant going so far as to actually intervene in the ACW (which, real or not, was one of the fears on this side) – i.e., troops in Canada or confronting the USN. The experiences you point to undoubtedly were a factor, as was their decision to abandon a real presence in North America. And, of course, there was hardly unity at home in Parliament or among the public on this issue. Intervention would have resulted in a gaggle of Pitts standing in the way. All that said, Rosy’s “win” at Stones River didn’t hurt the cause…
True that – it is one of the great potential turning points, however. “One war at a time” and all that.
Old Rosey got a bit unhinged when his aid was decapitated right beside him. I think it would have had a similar effect on almost everyone. Almost.
But then, at Chickamauga he did not have that excuse.
Rosecrans the “weak” army commander pulls off the Tullahoma campaign next.
… and like Professor Simpson says he stood his ground at Stones River. “Weak”.
I think you nailed it–after Fredericksburg anything that looked like a victory would be seized as such.
Rosecrans is a mystery to me. He clearly had skill, and if someone like Albert Castel is willing to take up his cause, as he did in your recent book, I’m willing to listen. But I find it hard to reconcile his performance after Chickamauga, particularly his underwhelming response to Price in Missouri in 1864, with the claims for his inclusion among the greats.
“Weak” in terms of seeming to repeatedly have had problems with getting his corps commanders to do what he wished them to do – McCook at Stones River and everyone but Thomas at Chickamauga come to mind.
Rosecrans seems like a solid corps commander; army level seems like it was too much to coordinate.
Best,
Bummer can’t get behind Rosecrans at all, especially after Chickamauga humiliation. He was fortunate that his “weakness” didn’t effect other conflicts.Then his display of uselessness after the retreat to Chattanooga. Today it might be called an extreme case of PTSD. Rosie may have been a great logistician and Catholic, but his behavior doesn’t rate him a great General, in Bummer’s top two, Grant and Sherman. They were both willing to pull the trigger, when others wouldn’t. They relied on each other to accomplish Southern defeat at any cost. Total War was what would bring the Southern States to their knees. Sherman said it best, “Grant stood by me, when they said I was crazy.” I stood by Grant, when they called him a drunk.” And that’s how we fight the war, standing by each other.
Bummer
At Chickamauga, Rosecrans famously sent an order for Wood to move in a way that didn’t make sense; it was not the first time his effort at command he added to the confusion of a battle. At Corinth almost a year before, he sent an order to one of his division commanders that the division commander returned after writing on the back “Respectfully returned. I cannot understand it.”. Later in the battle, when the Confederates looked like they might win, Rosecrans cracked, riding around screaming and ordering people to burn supplies. Fortunately he was ignored and his subordinates rallied and beat the confederates back.
Actually, if I recall correctly the order made sense when issued but by the time it was delivered things had changed.
Yep, I don’t disagree – seems like Rosecrans hit his competency level at corps command, which is nothing to dismiss, but it seems like he needed someone steady as a superior to help keep his focus.
Or someone next to him who could keep his head. The death of Col. Garesche had a profound effect on Rosecrans.
Who was holding Rosecrans hand and patting his head during the Tullohoma campaign to keep him focused?
The man who conceived of the Tullahoma campaign: the man who would be the 20th president of the USA.
James Garfield… yeah, I’m not really sure about that. He seems to have just aped whatever he thought would make him look good in the eyes of Washington. He wasn’t at all behind the success of the Tullahoma campaign, I think. See Peter Cozzen’s “This Terrible Sound”.
Garfield certainly deserves credit for his role in formulating Tullahoma, as well as for advocating a reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland (which wasn’t adopted), but there’s little doubt that much of that was done with an eye to Washington. This was hardly surprising given his simultaneously holding the position of Chief of Staff and a seat in Congress – certainly an interesting (and potentially conflicting) little circumstance..
IIRC, there was quite an “Old Army” connection between the Garesche and Ord families, unto Maj. Gen. James Garesche Ord, who commanded the 28th Division in WW II. Interesting if they were namesakes, marriages, or both…
Tullahoma was quite an achievement, but it does seem that for every day where Rosecrans “earned his pay,” in GSP’s phase, there were as many where he did not quite measure up…not sure why that was, but it seems undeniable.
Best,
Many? Rosecrans never lost a battle until Chickamauga… where he was outnumbered.
True, but being outnumbered hardly covers all of the reasons which made Chickamauga a Yankee debacle.Just ask Tom Wood, for one…..
Oh, he was beaten at Chickamauga. The Confederates were just better those two days. Although ultimately it was just a setback for the Union. They didn’t even lose Chattanooga.
It paid to make sure that your opponent was Bragg and his collection of malcontents.
Just because battles like Iuka, Corinth and Stones River are technically considered US wins doesn’t mean that Rosecrans performed well at them.
Western Virginia too, he won in West Virginia too.
Of course, the same could be said about battles like Shiloh, Champion Hill, Orchard Knob/Missionary Ridge,….And at Iuka Rosy wasn’t in command….
Thats news about Iuka.
Really? Let’s talk about acoustic shadows, converging columns (only one of which was led by Rosy), who did/didn’t hear the sounds of battle, etc. Or are you suggesting that Ord was also “in command”?
Ord didnt fight the battle of Iuka; Rosecrans did:
http://www.waymarking.com/waymarks/WM3TDQ_Battle_Of_Iuka
Rosecrans was in command of the US side in the battle.
Rosecrans is also considered to have commanded at the battle of Corinth even though he was still under Grant.
Ord “didn’t fight the battle of Iuka” because his column, which under Grant’s orders to both was to converge with Rosecrans, didn’t in fact reach the convergance. That was solely due to the acoustic shadow, as a result of which he didn’t know that Rosecrans was already engaged with Price. Grant was on the field with Ord and clearly was in charge of two subordinates who were trying to work a double envelopment under his orders. They were no different than corps commanders executing an army commander’s plan and orders. Grant was not on the field at Corinth and Rosecrans was supposed to fight, and did fight, the battle alone.
I think the whole “acoustic shadow” thing is an overly complex theory that can be explained away in a much easier fashion. Over that kind of distance, in that terrain, musketry simply doesn’t carry … and the few cannons which were brought forward changed hands multiple times, so the fact that Ord reported “sporadic cannonading” shouldn’t come as a surprise. Ord was waiting to hear the sounds of a general engagement, but under Rosecrans’ deployment it simply sounded like the two forces were skirmishing at most.
Kinda reminds me of Grabau’s “inversion layer” thingy at Battle of Raymond. Very simple explanation why Gregg didn’t realize he was facing a division of troops: because McPherson hid his deployment by marching his men around the fields instead of up the road and into the fields. The inversion here seems to be of the cranial-rectal variety on Gregg’s part to not perform a little recon before committing himself to an envelopment manuever.
I use the term “acoustic shadow” in the non-technical sense of one command not hearing sound which would cause it to understand that a general fight was underway. There are instances of the technical variety during the war, as well, but Iuka may have been in the more general sense. Then there was Perryville….
I’m just watching, at this point…
Just feel this should be noted:
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, August 31, 1863.
MY DEAR GENERAL ROSECRANS: Yours of the 22nd was received yesterday. When I wrote you before, I did [not] intend, nor do I now, to engage in an argument with you on military questions. You had informed me you were impressed through General Halleck that I was dissatisfied with you; and I could not bluntly deny that I was, without unjustly implicating him. I therefore concluded to tell you the plain truth, being satisfied the matter thus appear much smaller than it would if seen by mere glimpses. I repeat that my appreciation of you has not abated. I can never forget whilst I remember anything, that about the end of last year and beginning of this, you gave us a hard-earned victory, which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over. Neither can I forget the check you so opportunely gave to a dangerous sentiment which was spreading in the North.
Yours, as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
But who cares what Lincoln thought?
You may like to know the US Army Campaign streamer for service at the the battle says MURFREESBOROUGH 1862-1863 on a blue over gray streamer.
And if you did not know, Army National Guard units with lineage to Confederate service are authorized to have gray over blue streamers which say First Manassas, Second Manassas and Sharpsburg.
See, I have no problem having the winner name the battle.