Later this month some people will celebrate Robert E. Lee’s birthday. So perhaps it’s time to look at the military career of the great Confederate leader and ask two related questions:
1. What was Lee’s greatest campaign (and why)?
2. What was Lee’s greatest battle (and why)?
The floor’s open.
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Lee’s greatest campaign was the Seven Day’s and the subsequent Second Manassas battle.
His greatest battle obviously was Chancelorsville. It was his plan to outwit a vast Union Army that outnumbered his, and outgeneral the arrogant and overconfident Joe Hooker (though Hooker wasn’t as bad a General as said, he was more suited to a corps command than an army). Lee having decisively defeated Hooker, well, it was all downhill from then on. Ahead in the distance lay a Pennsylvania town called Gettysburg, which would lead, less than two years later and many more battles, to a sleepy Virginia hamlet called Appomattox.
Personally I’ve always felt that 2nd Manassass was his greatest battle. Many point to Chancellorsville, but to me the risks were too great (though he succeeded) and the price too high. At 2nd Manassas the potential union of two federal armies called for an aggressive move, and Lee’s manuevers resulted in a battle mostly fought on the tactical defensive, and in the end yielded some pretty stunning (if not decisive) results.
Steve Light is obviously a bright, well-read man.
Well I seem to remember reading a pretty good book on 2nd Manassas…
Since I only answered question 2, I will take perhaps a more controversial shot at question 1.
Obviously the Battle of Gettysburg was a disaster for Confederate man-power. But some authors who have looked at logistics, particularly Kent Masterson Brown, have made pretty persuasive arguments that the campaign as a whole provided much needed supplies for Lee’s army. Brown even argues that the Gettysburg Campaign prevented a supply crisis and fed Lee’s army throughout the summer of 1863 when food supplies were not to be found elsewhere.
From a purely strategic viewpoint: the Gettysburg Campaign disrupted federal plans almost for the whole campaigning season, and netted a huge supply haul. In that sense it could be rated a success.
The man power loss was significant, and perhaps a fatal blow. But the casualties were also significant at Antietam, Chancellorsville and during the Seven Days. What significant strategic advantages did those battles earn him?
I agree with you on Second Bull Run. Lee definitely did the right thing by dividing his army there, and it paid off in spades. At Chancellorsville, like you said, this tactic was on the cutting edge of risky, to say the least. If Hooker had launched a coordinated attack at any time after Lee detached Jackson’s Corps, he’d probably have demolished the ANV. He lost his nerve at a critical moment. I think Alan’s right in saying that Fighting Joe was more able at the corps level.
Although he ultimately lost, Lee’s conduct of the 1864 Overland Campaign was very competent. In addition to his superb defensive battles, Lee wasn’t afraid to employ aggressive blocking maneuvers when the situation called for it.
I wonder if the point of this question is to point out that Lee’s greatest campaigns were not Lee’s campaigns. Seven Pines and Manassas was actually just Lee’s defense against the peninsula campaign. Chancellorsville was Hooker’s campaign.
When it came to planning out a strategic campaign, Lee seems to have fallen short, with both ending in near disaster (Antietam and Gettysburg).
West Virginia for a three-pete?
I think the 2nd Battle of Bull Run and the overall Campaign is without a doubt Lee’s finest moment. Of course, Stonewall Jackson deserves a small bit of praise too (LOL). His most brilliant battle would have to be Chancellorsville – again with a little help from Stonewall. His worst battle has to be 7 Days. One uncoordinated, mistimed, attack after another – ending in the fiasco of Malvern Hill. It didn’t really accomplish much from a strategic point of view. Its main impact was confirm – in McClellans mind – that he needed massive reinforcements, and to confirm in Lincoln’s mind that he needed a new AoP commander.
Actually, Lee’s battles on the Peninsula accomplished a great deal. They resulted in the complete removal of McClellan’s whole army from the gates of Richmond all the way back to Harrison’s Landing and eventually to Washington (McClellan cooperated to a large extent here). The blame for the poorly-executed Confederate attacks (and all of them were) can rightly be laid at the feet of Stonewall Jackson, whose image was somewhat tarnished by this campaign.
Of course I’m not suggesting that this was Lee’s greatest campaign. Had McClellan been more aggressive, he might have been able to take the initiative after Porter’s victory at Beaver Dam Creek, or even after Malvern Hill.
As for the Antietam Campaign – take out the “lost order” and who knows what would’ve happened. And Gettysburg was a damn close thing.
“They resulted in the complete removal of McClellan’s whole army from the gates of Richmond all the way back to Harrison’s Landing and eventually to Washington (McClellan cooperated to a large extent here)”
Don’t understand your point. Lincoln was responsible for moving the AoP back to the DC area – not McClellan or Lee. Or course, indirectly blah blah. As for moving the AoP to Harrison Landing, McClellan had been thinking of changing his base to the James River for some time. The AoP on the James was in a better position to continue the attack on Richmond then it had been previously. I’d add that the idea of attacking McClellan right flank didn’t even originate with Lee.
The thing is, Lincoln would never have moved the AOP to Washington had Mac had a successful campaign against Richmond–that’s why he was there to begin with. He’d originally started his advance from Harrison’s Landing. I can understand his uneasiness at having his army divided by the swollen Chickahominy, but Mac did nothing more than react to Lee’s maneuvers, even as his troops were winning victories.
Are you saying that as McClellan had been inching his way up the York-James Peninsula for all that time, he was thinking of moving his base BACK to Harrison’s Landing? If so, why didn’t he do it before he got to the Chickahominy? How long had he been thinking of the switch–was it before the first battle at Beaver Dam–or after?
I would say campaign would be Second Bull Run because he really reoriented the direction of the war there.
I would say battle might be Fredericksburg because it was one of the great defeats ever given to a United States Army. Jackson’s part of the line was a problem but in front of Marye’s Heights was a located total defeat.
Chris