As you may have heard by now, the new issue of Civil War Monitor is available, and bloggers Ethan Rafuse, Kevin Levin, and Andy Hall have contributed articles. So have I … a little piece on what was going on some 150 years ago as Ulysses S. Grant struggled to keep his job so that he could do his job of taking Vicksburg. To access the piece, go here, and insert the following:
username: crossroads
password: cwmonitor44
Then go to the issue library, click on the current issue (which features a certain movie on its cover), click on the digital issue, and you are there. My piece begins on page 50. It will be available for viewing until March 9.
While you are there, you might also enjoy this book review. Indeed, you might also enjoy the whole journal.
Nice article. Thank you for sharing.
There is an aspect of the initial planning for the 1862-1863 campaign on the river that I wonder about. As you point out, no one told Grant about what was being planned in September-October. In August Halleck mentioned Vicksburg in correspondence with Curtis but not with Grant. Why? One thought is that Halleck did not initially feel that Vicksburg was within Grant’s sphere of command and that he at one time hoped to have Curtis take the lead.
Grant certainly wasn’t part of the plan to take Vicksburg in August for at least two reasons: Grant had barely enough men in his department to hold what had been gained, and Halleck had no confidence in Grant’s abilities. It’s ironic that it took McClernand successfully lobbying Lincoln for an independent command for Halleck to place any faith in Grant, if for no other reason than Grant was the only man senior enough to mitigate the threat Halleck perceived in having McClernand rise to army commander.
Nice article. Thanks for sharing!
This passage touches on a couple of points I have been wondering about for some time:
“From the moment he assumed command of operations against Vicksburg, Grant knew that the best way to advance against the city from his position on the west bank was to move south, cross the Mississippi below Vicksburg, and approach he city from the south. At the moment, however, that was impossible…”
Are we sure that Grant always knew that was the best approach? That seems to be what he implies in his Memoirs, but do we really have any evidence early on that backs up the idea that that was his plan from the start?
We know that he sent a letter to Admiral David Dixon Porter on March 29, asking Porter to help him run troops and supplies south of Vicksburg — but is there any other correspondence before that date where Grant actually reveals his ultimate plan to anyone else?
************
Second, it’s always a little confusing to me. Did Grant send all his troops on Porter’s boats — or did some of them actually march down the west bank of the river, for the purpose of meeting up at Hard Times (or wherever it was)?
And at least one CSA officer thought he had it on good authority that Grant would launch a frontal attack:
GRENADA, March 3, 1863.
Lieutenant-General PEMBERTON:
Later and more specific information goes to show that the fixed purpose of the Federals is to attack Vicksburg by gunboats at upper and lower batteries, and, under cover of fog or darkness, to land 50,000 troops in front of the city and storm the works in front. This information comes from a source entirely reliable, who got it directly from high Federal military authority, as a great secret.
SAM. HENDERSON,
Commanding Scouts
Somewhat misinformed, I guess…
http://gathkinsons.net/sesqui/?p=5045
Grant knew from the beginning what would be the best route, and shared that view with J. Russell Jones, a Galena friend, who relayed that insight to Elihu B. Washburne in a letter dated January 28, 1863, in Washburne’s papers at the Library of Congress.
The transports were not carrying Grant’s men at the time they ran the batteries.
Brooks, thanks very much!
Well, technically, they were carrying *some* of Grant’s men.
The crews of the boats refused to risk the journey, so volunteers were taken from the regiments to serve as crew members during the run. IIRC, the midwestern regiments were so full of riverboat men that they ended up turning away most of the volunteers.
Picky, picky.
Wasn’t trying to be picky … just thought the ability of the western armies to McGyver things up with a moment’s notice made for a cool story.
Also, I went home and looked at your book. Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph over Adversity. It has a great map showing Grant’s march on the west coast of the Mississippi – from Miliken’s bend to Bruinsberg (I think).
Also I just found out about another book on the subject, “Ninety-Eight Days: Geographers View Vicksburg Campaign” by Warren Grabau.
Finally: One more question. Is that artillery at Vicksburg?
There’s Confederate artillery on the bluffs, and both sides brought up artillery during the siege.
Grabau’s book is interesting … he was a close personal friend of Ed Bearss. Vicksburg historiography for the past 30 years has varied little from the story woven by Bearss’ three-volume set, which was based mostly on the O.R. For this reason, where the O.R. had major gaps due to the fluid nature of the campaign, the story tended to incur a great deal of supposition. Grabau’s book diverges more than most other writers from the traditional storyline, but often in strange ways.
Where Bearss doesn’t even mention McPherson at Port Gibson, Grabau places him in command of the left wing with Osterhaus attached to Smith’s brigade. Grabau also makes the same mistake at Champion Hill, designating McPherson as the commander of the right wing with Hovey’s division attached to the XVII corps. He is a bit more accurate in his description of Raymond than Bearss, but still has the 68th Ohio running from battle (they did not) and explains the Confederate confusion by claiming that an inversion layer kept the smoke too close to the ground for sufficient visibility. Not only was the weather for May 12th, 1863 not conducive to an inversion layer, but first-hand battle sketches show dust clouds rising hundreds of feet into the air.
If you love maps, Grabau’s book is a must-have. Detailed topographical USGS maps accompany every field of conflict and beyond … a product of the fact that Grabau worked as a geologist who helped develop some of these maps for the Corps of Engineers in Vicksburg (my old employer!). But caveat emptor … the troop positions on these maps are layed out in the most general form, and can leave you scratching your head if you’re trying to follow along in the text.
Grabau is my favorite account of the Vicksburg Campaign, and where he still has some gaping errors in his version, at least he doesn’t try to write McPherson out of the picture or paint him as a bumbling noob, and he doesn’t fall over himself trying to redeem McClernand for some inexplicable reason.
Yeah, Dr. Simpson covers this in Triumph Over Adversity. Source is Papers of U.S. Grant, but I don’t recall the exact passage he used. You can see in PUSG that Grant landed at Young’s Point and immediately began issuing orders that amounted to an integrated plan to move south of the city (explore the bayou system flowing south from Richmond, continue digging Grant’s canal, and open up a route through Lake Providence). Yazoo Pass was initiated around the same time, but was originally intended as a raid on the Yazoo River system and the railroad bridge at Grenada.
Porter and Sherman strongly opposed the plan; Sherman tried to impress his brother in the senate with the idea that it was the most foolhardly mission ever undertaken. Sherman’s brother shrugged off the complaint by saying, in not so many words “I don’t know nothing about no military stuff dude.” It was Porter’s fear of the plan that led him to explore the Steele Bayou / Black Bayou route to Rolling Fork, which nearly ended in disaster. If you’re ever in the area and drive up 61 North, you can see Deer Creek between Valley Park and Rolling Fork. It will leave you scratching your head wondering “WHAT in the hell was Porter thinking???” Deer Creek is a glorified ditch. Half the time, you can’t even get a bass boat in Black Bayou.
It was Sherman and Porter’s resistance to the move south that led Grant to scout out Snyder’s Bluff in April as a last-ditch alternative. Bristling with heavy artillery and rifle pits from top to bottom, it was protected on two sides by an unfordable bayou and in front by the Yazoo River. The only approach available to Grant’s army was across a one-mile stretch of open marshy farmland swept by the enemy’s artillery.
I’m curious about Dr. Simpson’s phrasing when he claimed Chickasaw Bayou was Grant’s idea. Grant’s plan was to move overland against Jackson, MS, repairing the railroad as he progressed. And though Halleck had made no objections to Grant’s movements Halleck eventually vetoed the plan and ordered Grant to make the riverine attack instead. On the eve of sending Sherman back to Memphis, Grant was still considering disobeying Halleck’s order, grasping at a perceived loophole that Halleck had given him earlier telling him he was free to fight the enemy where he pleased. He presented Sherman with two options: stick to Halleck’s plan, or break free of the railroad and make a rapid march on Jackson. Luckily, Sherman appears to have talked some sense into him, and he obeyed the direction dictated by Lincoln and Halleck.
Grant’s preference is a different matter than what Grant ordered, because there really were only three ways to get at Vicksburg from where he was: by the river, over land, or both. That wasn’t hard to see. Clearly Grant wavered as to what he preferred until he got a better idea of what McClernand might be up to … then it was essential to move, period, in his mind.
Regarding Tony’s point about Grant presenting Sherman with two options, I think it important to note what Grant wrote to Sherman: “My notion is to send two divisions back to Memphis, and fix upon a day when they should effect a landing, and press from here with this command at the proper time to cooperate. If I do not do this I will move our present force to Grenada, including Steele’s, repairing road as we proceed, and establish a depot of provisions there. When a good ready is had, to move immediately on Jackson, Mississippi, cutting loose from the road. Of the two plans I look most favorably on the former.” Read that last sentence again. He didn’t need Sherman to talk sense into him.
He preferred that plan because he had been ordered three times to undertake it. And yet, he still considered sticking to what he wanted to do, which was move on Jackson overland.
Great article by the way! Would love to see you write a one volume account of the Vicksburg Campaign some day. I remember you saying you were penciling in your travel schedule for the year, you should consider dropping by VNMP and seeing the work they have done in clearing the park of trees to open up the view.