The interview with Jefferson Davis highlighted in this past Sunday’s blog entry raises an interesting question. Accepting the fundamental importance of protecting slavery in explaining secession and the formation of the Confederacy, would the Confederacy have been willing to surrender slavery to secure independence? Between the Kenner mission and the enlistment of blacks on Confederate ranks in 1865, something can be said for the notion that the idea was being considered at the highest levels. But would the majority of Confederates have accepted this sacrifice to secure independence, or did they see Confederate independence as meaningful only if it meant the continued protection of the peculiar institution?
What’s the point of secession absent slavery? “Independence”? For what? From what?
One of the commonly held opinions among (north) Americans in this period as to the weakness of the Latin American republics were the divisions among the post-independence nations; the break-up of Gran Colombia, the incessant conflicts between Buenos Aires and the remainder of what is today Argentina, Mexico’s vulnerability to the European powers…there’s a reason the (north) American elites all believed in Manifest Destiny; creating a continental nation was accepted as the only certain way to maintain independence from the great powers.
There’s a reason Texas joined the US, after all.
Yet another indictment of the Confederacy’s leadership class…
What was the quote by Margaret Mitchell – “all we have is cotton, and slaves, and arrogance”?
Best,
I don’t know if that the right question. The confederates after Jan 1st 1863 had 3 alternatives: (1) Win the war and keep slavery (2) Win the war but lose slavery (3) lose the war and lose slavery. Davis wanted option (1) and as long as it was possibility kept that as the policy. Its only in late 1864 when it became obvious that defeat was inevitable unless something was done that Davis and other Confederates reluctantly moved to Option 2. The use of Slaves as Confederates soldiers was undertaken in 1865 only because as R.E. Lee stated “We must decide whether slavery shall be extinguished by our enemies and the slaves be used against us, or use them ourselves.”
It was not merely Robert E. Lee who supported arming African-Americans in the Confederate army. Davis, Benjamin, Kenner, joined him and eleven officers signed Cleburne’s memorandum. Governors Smith of Virginia and Allen of Louisiana also supported the idea. In his bio on Jefferson Davis, William C. Davis comments that several notable citizens favored arming blacks in September, 1864
phil_leigh@me.com
Well, popular culture has always seemed to depict Johnny Reb telling Billy Yank that it wasn’t about slavery, it was about States Rights, and “why did y’all have to invade us? Why don’t y’all go home and leave us alone.”
Perhaps they believed they had forged a separate identity from the US, but if that is the case, I believe that it was the result of propaganda, and their own societal class distinctions which, for most, were the innate mores of a person’s proper place in society. That sense of adhering to the wishes of one’s betters certainly had a large role in the secession movement, reinforced from the state legislatures, the newspapers and even the pulpits of the South.
In the end, however, the only State Right that played in all of this was the right to own a human being in bondage, and have everyone else, in all other states, become complicit in it. When the rest of the US would not play nice with the Fugitive Slave Act, and instead invaded the South with Abolitionists [in person, and in pamphlets], it became intolerable. This was what drove the elites, for not only was Slavery a socially accepted norm in Southern society, it was an enormous economic piece as well. It was the threat to the economics of slavery that moved the elites to action, though they often pointed at other issues, much like a kid with his hand in the cookie jar, pointing at his little brother with the other hand and saying “He made me do it!”
I see Davis [taking him at his word -- what he said to the visitors -- Jaquess and Gilmore] giving up slavery, but I do see most of the other elites not giving up the institution. Davis showed his “states rights” affinity all the way back to shortly after his wounding in Mexico when the president offered him a Brigadiership and a post in the Mississippi State Militia. Davis declined it stating the President had no authority to place people in state militia posts, that was a state right.
Further, I believe their effort in March of 1865 to raise slaves into the army as soldiers was a forlorn hope to avoid the potential gallows when they finally lost the war, and for no other reason. They had little left in the way of slaves [as Davis pointed out, around half were gone by July,1864].
It might be instructive to see what legislation Davis introduced in Congress, to see if he had made any attempt to curtail the “dictatorship” of the government/presidency, as he put it. Perhaps he offered an amendment to the Constitution which would curtail the powers of the Presidency [in particular] and the Federal government as a whole, and strengthened the rights of the states.
“In the end, however, the only State Right that played in all of this was the right to own a human being in bondage…”
While slavery was the right that triggered secession, it was not the only right that mattered.
Excluding minor exceptions, the Confederate Constitution prohibited the central government from spending money on “internal improvements”, which are commonly labeled “public works” presently. The southern states had long felt that “internal improvements” were a “state responsibility”, within the doctrine of states rights.
Finally, the disagreements that Jefferson Davis had with a number of governors including those of Georgia, Texas, and North Carolina underscored the primacy of states rights. For example, governors could enlist men into state militia thereby exempting them from Confederate conscription.
On “internal improvements” – really? Then you’ll have to explain the platform which Breckinridge ran on in 1860 and what it said about the feds and a transcontinental railroad.
I can’t see how they could have accepted ending slavery as a condition of independence. First, so many of the political and military leaders were slave owners that the Confederacy would have faced its own civil war if its overweening central government tried to end slavery. Second, there is the obvious fact that the Confederacy’s only reason for existence was to defend and extend the realm of slavery. Third, white fears of post-emancipation black violence would be much more realistic in a country where a third of the population had been slaves and where Federal troops could not be called upon for help.
Questions for you -
We commonly talk about the northern cause in terms of evolution: the North “evolved” from a war tp preserve the Union to a war to end slavery, Lincoln “evolved” from his promise not to interfere with slavery where it existed to issuing the emancipation proclamation. etc. etc. etc. We use this hypothesis all the time to get around hundreds upon hundreds of statements from 1861 where the north plainly said that the war was to preserve the Union and NOT to end slavery.
Why then is it so inconceivable to you that the confederates didn’t “evolve” themselves as the war progressed? Why do we place unshakable and permanent credence in Alexander Stephens’ cornerstone speech of 1861, then conveniently look the other way at Jefferson Davis’ widely published interview with Jaquess and Gilmore in 1864?
Simple answer: Before the war many pro-Union Northerners expressed contempt for slavery, but viewed its destruction as a practical impossibility. In other words, these Northerner Republicans did not evolve an anti-slavery viewpoint during the war, they merely came to see eradication of slavery as possible. Southern secessionists held that slavery was a positive good before the war. So their “evolution’ would not have been seeing that it was practical to abolish slavery, but rather that what they had originally though was good was now bad.
Second, the actions of Southern slave owners during the war indicates that many of them did not recognize that slavery was doomed until the very end. When Union armies moved into the South, slave owners often went to great expense to move their slaves away from Union forces, obviously hoping that slavery would continue once peace was restored. The fact that there continued to be a market in slaves even after the Emancipation Proclamation argues that for most of the power elite in the South there was no evolution in recognizing even the practicalities of the moment. That market should have collapsed on January 1, 1863, but it did not.
Finally, as Kevin Levin’;s book on the Crater makes clear, as late as 1864 Confederate soldiers said in their letters home that they were fighting to prevent the emancipation of blacks, which had taken on a ever more dangerous cast as black soldiers were now coming against them by the thousands. Independence was so intricately tied to the preservation and extension of slavery that it was inconceivable to the decision makers that the first was worth the cost in blood with out the second.
“Finally, as Kevin Levin’;s book on the Crater makes clear, as late as 1864 Confederate soldiers said in their letters home that they were fighting to prevent the emancipation of blacks, which had taken on a ever more dangerous cast as black soldiers were now coming against them by the thousands. Independence was so intricately tied to the preservation and extension of slavery that it was inconceivable to the decision makers that the first was worth the cost in blood with out the second.”
So a couple of privates who wrote letters to their wives about continuing the fight for slavery after the battle of the Crater were “decision makers”…but Jefferson Davis wasn’t?
That’s some fancy logic you got there!
That last sentence was intended as the conclusion of the comment. Sorry if that confused you.
Why don’t I see it,because unlike the Union,the so called confederacy took no steps in that direction,even the general order in 65,to use slaves as solders,didn’t even come close to Cleburne’s plan.The confederacy held on to slavery with a literal death grip.
Partington’s question is well taken.
There really is no reason why historians should only permit Lincoln to change his War aims. Davis should get the same opportunity. Moreover it appears that by July 1864, he had changed his objective when specifically commenting that the Confederacy was fighting for independence, not slavery.
– Phil Leigh
phil_leigh@me.com
The real question is whether Davis could persuade others to follow his lead. I have always thought that by mid-war that Davis’s #1 aim was Confederate independence, and that he could have written a reverse Lincoln-to-Greeley, August 22, 1862 letter.
I’m always amused when people assume that historians are a unified block sharing the same opinions.
“First, so many of the political and military leaders were slave owners that the Confederacy would have faced its own civil war if its overweening central government tried to end slavery.”
Certainly the Confederate Congress was dominated by slaveholders. However, according to Herman Hattaway and Richard Beringer in *Jefferson Davis: Confederate President* (University of Kansas Press, 2002) only a minority of Rebel generals were slaveholders.
phil_leigh@me.com
Don’t see that that contradicts what I said Phil.
When Patrick Cleburne brought this up as a possible solution, he was shot down hard and his recommendations were buried in Richmond, see “Stonewall of the West: Patrick Cleburne and the Civil War.” He was considered a naive Irishman that just did not understand southern culture for even suggesting such a possibility.
It is true the plan was rejected and greeted with disgust by many people, but when Claiborne first presented his proposal to Joseph E. Johnston his proposal had the support of 14 other generals and colonels in the Army of Tennessee. Notably William J. Hardee, Benjamin F. Cheatham, and Thomas C. Hindman endorsed or supported the proposal. Hardee even presented Claiborne to Johnston to present the proposal to Johnston.
In addition, Cleburne may have suffered professionally for his recommendation.
He wasn’t demoted though.
All soldiers, not politicians.
Well they were corps and division level generals in the Army of the Tennessee. Hindman was a politician in fact. Cleburne, as Hindman’s friend, was involved in Hindman’s politics back in Arkansas. And the popular Major General Cheatham was a plantation owner and was political after the war.
Oh… and as Lieutenant and Major Generals they were the leaders of thousands of soldiers.
Davis’ position was apparently theoretical. He did not care to speak for the people, and was not authorized to speak for the states. So who the hell was he speaking for??
I think it’s entirely plausible that the Confederacy would give up slavery or “involuntary servitude” if that might result in the end of war and their independence. But there’s a huge caveat: let’s look at the meaning that black “freedom” actually held in the minds of Southern leaders (and probably many Americans). We have all the evidence we need from the Southern state legislatures who reconvened in 1865 and 1866, passed the XIII Amendment and, in some cases the very same day, passed onerous Black Codes severely limiting the civil and political rights of blacks. For example, look at the vagrancy laws (with punishments allowing for months of enslavement) which eliminated any chance at laborers moving off the plantations for economic independence or advancement. I’m sure that after some hard thinking, Confederate leaders would have accepted a nation in which bondage was finished, but where blacks would be tied to the land like Russian serfs without the right to vote, serve on juries, testify against white men, were subject to corporal punishment and required to carry proof of employment (at the risk of re-enslavement) etc.
The Confederate constitution enshrined slavery and made it next to impossible to eliminate short of tearing up the document and rewriting the entire thing. No state in the Confederacy had the power to ban slavery or prevent the ownership of a slave. If the elites in the Confederacy evolved over the issue of slavery it was going to be at the point of a gun and self preservation of their own lives. Without slavery the Confederacy could not exist. That was why they attempted to leave the United States. That was why they went to war. What was there to have if thye had t ogive up slavery in order to gain independence? Would the common Southerner be interested in independence after fighting a war over slavery only to see that cause end? There were no other reasons for the war.
Furthermore the South was dependent upon the North, not the other way around prior to the war. What would an independent Confederacy have gained if they fought a long war, but lost the reason they started that war? They could not expand westward or to the south either. Just about half…HALF of the South’s wealth was tied up in slaves. Freeing those slaves would have wiped out half the value of the South instantly. Plus the cost of that long war would have seen a fiscally crippled Confederacy dependent on who to do much of anything?
I bet if the war had ended with an independent Confederacy and no slavery some of the Upper South would have wanted to rejoin the Union within a decade if not sooner. Would there have been another war over that issue? There was no future for an independent Confederacy without slavery.
Jimmy, I also feel if the war had ended with an independent Confederacy and no slavery some of the Upper South would have made as effort to rejoin the Union. I wouldn’t be surprised if the upper south had of rejoined the union in time the lower south would have rejoined or there would have been those in the lower south advocating a reconciling with the Union.
Post war an independent Confederacy slavery or no slavery would still have been heavily dependent on the United States. With the south’s lack of manufacturing the south would have been dependent on the US’s industry. It would also have been dependent on the US’s cotton market to sell it’s cotton. Much of the south I’m sure would have been dependent on the United States and banks and capital also. All this would have been a long negotiating process starting from scratch. Not sure all in the Confederacy had though that far ahead (maybe many in the south that opposed secession had though ahead) . I think would did happen post war in most of the North would of still happened post war with an independent Confederacy. Northern manufacturing, mining, and railroads would have grown to the point cotton wealth in the south would have been dwarfed and become a lot smaller slice of the pie.
I find it interesting that some people speak of what might have happened had there been no war, but conveniently ignore the fact that the Upper South did not secede until after the war began. Only the seven states composing the Lower South seceded. When one realizes how much industry, population, and economical resources were in the Upper South compared to the Lower South, it makes it even more unlikely that an independent Confederacy would have lasted without a war. Davis ordered the attack on Sumter knowing full well he had to have a war in order to give the Confederacy a chance to actually become independent. Otherwise those opposed to secession were going to upset the balance of power in those seven states and begin to rejoin the Union one by one.
The Lower South’s extraction based economy which was built on slave labor and the political control by an elite class could not survive on its own. It had to have the rest of the United States to support itself. Ironically we see the same situation today when people talk of secession. The same states almost always rely on more federal income than not compared to the rest of the country as a region. The imbalance is nowhere close to what it was during the Antebellum era, but an imbalance still exists.
In addition, Cleburne may have suffered professionally for his recommendation.
Or maybe he benefited from it. One unproven, unsupported speculation is as good as the other. Maybe Cleburne was going to be demoted and this proposal -approved by his boss Hardee – may have saved him.
A cogent analysis of Cleburne’s rank status following his “Memorandum” is provided by Steven Woodworth in *Jefferson Davis and His Generals*.
Essentially Woodworth concludes the two chief reasons Cleburne promotion was held back were (in rank order) 1. He was not a West Point graduate 2. He was identified as a member of the anti-Bragg cabal. This remained a handicap even after Bragg left the army because Braxton had the ear of Davis in Richmond where he served as an advisor. Woodworth admits that the Memorandum was certainly not helpful and may have been a factor as well.
phil_leigh@me.com
You can throw in the fact that he loved serving with Hardee and didn’t want to leave his command. And that while he was a very good General – he was part of an Army that fought inconclusive battles or just plain lost. He did well at Chattanooga (especially his rearguard against Hooker), Stones River, and the Retreat to Atlanta – but those weren’t exactly shining Confederate victories. Being part of Lee’s Army gave everyone involved a leg up. Hood and S.D. Lee come to mind. Cleburne’s other problem was he wasn’t a Tennessean – but from Arkansas. Given the large number of Tennesseans in the “Army of Tennessee” that was a bit of a drawback. As was not being near Richmond.
“You cannot make soldiers of slaves, or slaves of soldiers. The day you make a soldier of them is the beginning of the end of the Revolution. And if slaves seem good soldiers, then our whole theory of slavery is wrong.”
- Howell Cobb