There’s been a good deal of debate over the years as to the performance of George G. Meade between July 3 and July 13, 1863. Should Meade have been more aggressive? Should he have counterattacked on July 3? Should he have attacked Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Williamsport? Did Meade let slip an opportunity to win the war outright in the summer of 1863?
I don’t think so. I believe it would have been difficult to mount a counterattack on July 3, especially as no preparations were made for one until after the repulse of the Confederate assault against the Union center earlier that afternoon. While I think that Meade might have been too restrained in the days immediately after the battle, which made easier Lee’s efforts at disengagement and retreat, I’m well aware that with the losses suffered by his own army and the tattered command situation that moving forward effectively would have posed a challenge. Whatever was to be done at Williamsport would have to have been done quickly, and by the time Meade was ready to consider an attack, the Confederates welcomed that opportunity. Absent the ability to pin Lee in place while severing his route of retreat across the Potomac, I think Lee could have bloodied Meade’s nose significantly (much as Lee himself proved fortunate when Hooker’s decision to withdraw after Chancellorsville deprived Lee of the chance to assault a well-fortified Union position).
I also don’t believe that the Army of the Potomac was the sort of army to do things quickly and without hesitation. Certainly its record in this regard was mixed, and Meade had not been on command long enough to change that army’s culture. Absent Reynolds and Hancock, Meade’s corps commanders were a mixed lot, although one could argue that in that sense the absence of Dan Sickles made up for some of that. Emerging for three days of hard fighting, it was asking a lot of this lot to launch another offensive that would have resulted in much more than another bloodletting.
And that’s for starters …
But you may feel differently.
Crossroads 
The Army I’ve no problem with no attack in the aftermath of Pickets Charge but the AoP was in better shape and the morale after winning the battle was very high. He could have picked his spot and have loaded up an attack. If the Army could go from the Wilderness right into Spotsylvania and still move offensively to the North Anna and so on the “worn out after a hard fight” seems a dodge. the soldiers of AoP managed to respond time and again it was the officers who lacked the staying power. Time and again the troops did as asked the problem was getting a commander who would ask and that wasn’t Meade or any of the predecessors
“a good plan this week is better than a perfect plan next week”
G.S.Patton
too often Union Generals waited for the “perfect plan”
I am soon going to start Eric W’s book on the retreat (I’ve read Brown’s). I agree that an attack at Williamsport was a Bad Idea, and one in the immediate wake of Pickett’s Charge probably was as well. But I do think an opportunity was missed during Lee’s retreat. I think the institutional slowness of the AotP was largely to blame, but I also think Meade made some mistakes.
Well, I’d take into account two things: (1) Two of Meade’s corps (I and III) were wrecked – sufficiently that in early 1864 they were finally blown up and swallowed by the II and V Corps. A third (XI) was close to wrecked and had morale issues. Only the VI had not taken much damage. The ANV was in tough shape but still capable of an effective defemse. (2) Putting together an effective attack is completely different from operating a reactive defense (which we seem to agree Meade did well at Gettysburg). By July 4 he still had been in command for only one week. He had just lost his two best corps commanders – Reynolds and Hancock. Execution of an attack would have been entrusted to the likes of Sedgwick (see Salem Church), Sykes, Slocum, Newton, French, Howard, and Hayes – not to mention significant changes at lower levels of command. I really believe that folks who blast Meade for not hammering the ANV while it was still above the Potomac aren’t being very realistic.
Lee had bigger problems than Meade. Because of the terrain, he could not cross the rivers back into Virginia. Rain swollen rivers and muddy roads trapped him on the Maryland side of the border. Had AotP attacked him from the rear and with Cavalry assets to the east and the D.C. garrison to the south, Lee could have been defeated right after Gettysburg and as a result, only one major force under Johnston would be left to the Confederacy.
He doesn’t have to hammer the ANV, he just has to hassle it. Lee had an immense amount of material to get to and south of the river, and that could have been more productively interfered with, IMO.
I’ve long thought that Meade (among many others on the Union side) might have compared unfavorably to Grant, Sherman and Sheridan in his ability to handle the stress of combat.
“Across the spectrum from training to war, these various studies support the assertion that
exposure to extreme environments can result in profound changes in mood which may vary
considerably from one individual to another. In turn, negative moods are generally
acknowledged to decrease performance, thus suggesting these mood changes can negatively
impact the performance of critical tasks and readiness for military duty.”
Click to access mPerformanceExtremePrePrint.pdf
(Did Nathan Bedford Forrest ever suffer a “negative mood” due to an “extreme enviroment?”)
The idea that degraded performance due to stress, rather than any particulars of the scenario explains the failure to pursue, or at least harrass Lee makes sense to me, but is impossible to prove.
I’ve long thought that Meade (among many others on the Union side) might have compared unfavorably to Grant, Sherman and Sheridan in his ability to handle the stress of combat.
“Across the spectrum from training to war, these various studies support the assertion that exposure to extreme environments can result in profound changes in mood which may vary considerably from one individual to another. In turn, negative moods are generally acknowledged to decrease performance, thus suggesting these mood changes can negatively impact the performance of critical tasks and readiness for military duty.”
Click to access mPerformanceExtremePrePrint.pdf
(Did Nathan Bedford Forrest ever suffer a “negative mood” due to an “extreme enviroment?”)
The idea that degraded performance due to stress, rather than any particulars of the scenario explains the failure to pursue, or at least harrass Lee makes sense to me, but is impossible to prove.
Unfortunately, most of the criticism of Meade’s post-Gettysburg actions which I’ve seen is focused on exactly that – a failure to pounce on the ANV and hammer it. I’m very skeptical that most of these critics would have been satisfied with “just … hassl[ing] it”. I agree that Meade may well have been able to do some of that, but in the end I’m not sure what large objective would have been accomplished.
What was the effective strength of the VI Corps during the pursuit – anyone know?
the AoP was less beat up than the ANV and where they still might have gotten away from a clse pursuit they were guaranteed to escape a non-pursuit.
“In any war, the number of generals who succeed in imposing their personalities on their own troops, let alone those of the enemy, is far smaller than generals themselves may like to believe.” quote by Desmond Young, Rommel-The Desert Fox-Publishers Harper & Brothers, 1950.
The first class of commanders are those generals that examplify the above statement: Lee, Rommel.
Then, there is a second class of commanders, the great fighting generals: Grant, Sherman, Jackson, Patton
Then, there is that third class of commanders, the great organizers: McClellan, Hooker .
I think Meade belongs in the third class of General. His charactor was not the sort to exploit battlefield opportunities.
Do you think Rommel or Patton (though Patton was more reckless) would have waited to attack Lee after Gettysburg, if either one had commanded the AOP?
Lee had an immense train of loot, wounded men, and prisoners which he had to get over the river. The passage of this could have been—should have been—interdicted.
Part of the problem was command and control. There were a couple of Union forces near the river which could have done much to affect things, but I don’t think Meade had effective control over them. But he could/should have asked Halleck to use them in an intelligent manner to intercept the retreat.
if I recall correctly, the VI Corps had about 15,000 at Gettysburg. It suffered fewer than 300 casualties, so there is no question that Meade’s largest corps should have been in good shape. Of course, it was under the command of a guy with a mediocre tactical record. Patton would have gotten past his supply lines and run out of fuel. How’d Rommel do against the A Team? As for Jackson, give me a good analysis of First Kernstown, Front Royal, Port Republic, the Seven Days, Cedar Mountain, Brawner’s Farm, and Second Manassas, Day 2. I’ll leave aside Stonewall’s defensive alignment at Hamilton’s Crossing – but who would think that the Yankees actually could have been that close to victory on the west bank of the Rappahannock in December, 1862?l
I agree with Brooks whole heartedly. Meade had his hands full with the logistical problems after three days of heavy expenditures of ammunition and powder, the loss of too many horses and mules, and of course, the approximately 23,000 of his own men — around 25% of his force, as killed, wounded and missing or captured. Additionally, his entire Medical Department would have to remain behind to treat many of those casualties, in addition to those that Lee left behind.
As Brooks mentioned, the loss of 33% of his Corps Commanders put a handicap to three Corps that saw the bulk of the heaviest fighting. That left a relatively untouched VIth Corps, to do the bulk of the chasing, along with the Cavalry. The Artillery had to be low on powder and shot, and with Lee capable of turning and fighting at a moment’s notice, that would be like going into battle with only one leg.
I just think Meade had neither sufficient men, horses, and medical personnel and supplies, nor enough artillery powder and shot to pursue Lee in a serious fashion — until he could be resupplied at least partially.
That said, I also think he did the right thing in sending VIth Corps as far as Fairfield, and the Cavalry farther than that to harass Lee’s rear. And the Cavalry acquitted itself well on top of South Mountain at Monterey Pass.
Nature also had a hand in this. The same rains that raised the Potomac too high to ford for Lee made many of the mountain roads impassable or extremely difficult for Meade, and also hampered intelligence operations keeping track of Lee’s movements.
I’m glad Lincoln never sent that letter.
Since I’m the one being critical of Meade here, I probably should offer some specifics.
1. Something I learned from Brown’s book on the retreat is that the Federal cavalry suffered greatly from lack of food and forage. On the evening of July 2nd, it should have been obvious that things were trending toward a climax on the 3rd. Meade was going to need his cavalry, either to cover a retreat or pursue Lee. The cavalry trains should have been ordered forward, ASAP. This is possibly on Pleasanton, but Meade should have made sure it happened.
2. Someone should have noticed and taken advantage of the road from Emmitsburg to Fairfield before the night of July 3-4. Get a force in position to block Monterey Pass.
3. Better use should have been made of Kelley in Western MD and French at Harper’s Ferry. This might be on Halleck, and probably is.
We found in our garden with a metal detecter that is like a cross with a round circle in the middle and a picture of a man who we asume is Lee Meade or meade Lee as on the left hand side of the picturs it says Meade and on the right side of the picture it says Lee and it looks like it might have hung from a ribbon or something like that .
I kind of think you answered it best yourself. Meade’s army was too disorganized, even in victory, to do anything in the aftermath of Lee’s attack on July 3, so Lee got away from that battlefield. By the time Meade caught up to him, at Williamsport, and got his army in place for an attack, Lee would have been glad to oblige. If Meade had attacked Lee’s works at Williamsport, it would have been a repeat of Fredericksburg, and the war would have gone on just as it did, only with Meade needlessly losing about 15,000 more men in this campaign.
How bad was the Cavalry’s condition after defeating Jeb Stuart, who arrived late and did little for Lee.Just look at the commanders at Meade’s disposal, does anybody think they were capable of lightning fast responce and efficient offensive operations? AOP still was languishing along under McClellan’s organization.
I think Meade was in no way, shape, or form able to mount an attack as Lee withdrew. His big mistake was engaging Lee in the first place. He could of lost the war in one battle. He was only saved when Lee refused to heed Longstreets advice to leave the union troops on the hill and march 85 miles to a realitively Undefended Washington. Meade could stay on the hill and watch Lee take Washington or he could abandon his defensive position and fight Lee on open ground. A chance missed on both sides.
He had no choice about “engaging Lee”. The only decision was where – at Gettysburg/environs or along Pipe Creek. Whether the decision to conduct the fight at Gettysburg was the wiser choice or not, it was at least in part made by Reynolds – Meade was dealing with what was pretty much a fait accompli by the afternoon of July 1. The notion that Lee should have heeded Longstreet’s advice and “marched 85 miles to a relatively undefended Washington” is largely the work of novelists. I think that veteran wargamers would refer to it as Panzergruppe Lee.
“I also don’t believe that the Army of the Potomac was the sort of army to do things quickly and without hesitation.”
Boy, no kidding. In all my reading on the AoP, I can only find one instance when it really moved fast and with a will, and that’s the pursuit of Lee after he abandoned Petersburg. (The flanking maneuver over the James in June of 1864 to get to Petersburg almost qualifies, but that’s always seemed to me to be merely moving efficiently.)
I can think of no example during the war when a large army was able to follow up on a victory and destroy an opposing army in battle prior to Appomattox, with the possible exception of the Army of Tennessee after the Battle of Franklin. I do not know why, but victory seems to have rendered the winning army incapable of immediate action to destroy the loser. So it was not just Meade, Lee could not do it either..
I give Meade a pass plus. Three days in command and the loss of Reynolds and Hancock,plus great loses. Has anyone got together the details of who and where the individual units were during those ten days?