The Assault on Missionary Ridge

What happened on November 25, 1863, remains one of the most mysterious events of the American Civil War. That afternoon four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland advanced against the Confederate rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, overwhelmed the Confederate defenders there, and then, after assessing their rather perilous situation, continued up the slope and overran the main Confederate battle line.

For years to come this would be known, and not without reason, as the miracle on Missionary Ridge. But it was hard to ascertain exactly what happened. What was Ulysses S. Grant’s plan? What orders did George H. Thomas issue? Did the men act on their own in storming the crest of the ridge? What happened on Orchard Knob?

As best as I can make it, this is what people intended, and what happened:

1. Grant’s plan on the morning of November 25, 1863, was simple. William T. Sherman would attack the Confederate right flank on the northern slope of Missionary Ridge, while Joseph Hooker, fresh from taking Lookout Mountain, would move east across Chattanooga Creek and attack the south end (the left flank) of the Confederate line. Thomas’s divisions would be held in reserve just east of Orchard Knob and would be used to support the other attacks (mainly by keeping the Confederates on the ridge looking at them) or to exploit an opportunity. Grant’s attack plan looked to Sherman to land the decisive blow.

2.  Sherman proved unable to deliver that blow. His attack on the Confederate right was stymied by a combination of terrain, an outstanding Confederate defensive action, and his own limitations as a combat commander. That said, enough observers on Orchard Knob saw a shift of Confederate forces to support the right flank that it was reasonable to assume that Confederate commander Braxton Bragg was thinning his center to strengthen his right, although it now seems evident that this did not happen. What’s important, however, is what the Union commanders on Orchard Knob thought was happening at the time.

3. Hooker’s movement against the Confederate left (a movement in which Thomas was more interested) stalled for a number of reasons, including issues of terrain and rebuilding bridges.

4. By midday it was clear that things were not going well, and Grant began to consider his options, featuring a new mission for Thomas’s divisions.  Thomas was not eager to mount an assault of any kind, and the strained relations between commanders meant that Grant’s ideas came across as suggestions, not directives or orders. Things were not going well on Orchard Knob, either.

5. By early afternoon (if not earlier) Grant had decided upon his plan. He would have Thomas order forward his four divisions to take the Confederate rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, then regroup and await orders to storm the crest. Thomas did not concur with the plan, and would not act unless given a direct order. Eventually an increasingly frustrated Grant gave that order. Several people on the knoll, including staff officer James H. Wilson, understood the complete plan and commander intent, while others only understood the orders as issued separately. The resulting confusion as to what was intended–some officers thought the ultimate goal was to assault the crest, while others simply recall orders to take the rifle pits at the base of the ridge and wait–offer telling commentary on how orders flowed down through Thomas’s chain of command. It’s clear that Thomas never conveyed commander intent but confined himself to implementing orders as they were issued and no more … in part because he thought the assault unwise.

6.  Grant’s plan was, in fact, unwise (which is far different than arguing that he did not have one). It would be easy enough to take the rifle pits, but holding them for a prolonged period of time simply put Union soldiers in harm’s way, and the longer they stayed in place the more harm would come to them. Thus local commanders decided to implement on their own the second stage of Grant’s plan (to storm the crest) without waiting for Grant’s orders to do so (or Thomas’s rendering of them). Not everyone knew of Grant’s intent, although some did, so other commanders were acting on their own. As some units started to advance, others decided to join the movement, and the assault began.

7. Grant thought the assault up the ridge to be premature, explaining reports of his unhappiness when he saw it commence. Thomas quickly disavowed any responsibility for the advance and expressed concern that it would fail.

8. For a number of reasons (faulty Confederate fortification of the ridge; low Confederate morale; the inability to fire around Confederate comrades fleeing up the slope from the rifle pits; the drape of the terrain; and sheer Yankee doggedness) the attack succeeded. One contributing factor was the appearance of Hooker’s men on the Confederate left, the timing of which seems to have been a product of circumstance rather than intent.

This is, as best as I can figure out, what happened. It’s a narrative based upon working for some time with primary sources, including reports filed at the time and recollections offered at various times. By the 1870s what had happened became an issue of dispute, shaped in large part by the continuing clashes of people who tended to embrace a narrative that elevated George Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland (and to a lesser extent Joe Hooker) versus those folks who hailed Grant (and that included Sherman). Thus the battle of Missionary Ridge continued, but in a different way, with the sharpest comments reserved for those in the Thomas/Cumberland/Hooker camp who declared that the Grant/Sherman camp (and the people assumed to be members of it) were intent on depriving Thomas, Hooker, and the Cumberlanders of their claims to greatness. Thus I’ve heard that a sign of Thomas’s greatness was that he timed Hooker’s arrival; that he both resisted Grant’s plan as insane and yet provided for its success by indicating that the crest should be the objective; and so on. That the documentary evidence for these claims is shaky and that it fails to explain the confusion among Thomas’s subordinates as to what to do is of little consequence to these folks, who see a conspiracy against their heroes at every turn.

That noted, what questions would you raise about the narrative offered above, and what actual evidence would you cite in support of your claims? I’ve offered my version, complete with an analysis of the evidence, in a volume of essays about Chattanooga edited by Steve Woodworth and Charles Grear. I direct your attention there if you want to see how I evaluated what was before me and how I treated the evolution of the contending narratives.


15 thoughts on “The Assault on Missionary Ridge

  1. John Foskett November 25, 2013 / 8:33 am

    Good stuff. I’ve recommended that essay (and the book) to others previously and I strongly recommend it again. In fact, nobody will regret spending his/her money on any of the four books released thus far in that series.

  2. jfepperson November 25, 2013 / 9:05 am

    I think your analysis is reasonable, and is the simplest explanation of the confused sequence of events.

  3. seanmunger November 25, 2013 / 12:32 pm

    Reblogged this on and commented:
    I don’t do a lot of hard-core battle history on my blog, but I did like this article on the Crossroads history site about the assault on Missionary Ridge during the Battle of Chattanooga in 1863. This is an angle I don’t usually cover here, so I thought some of you might enjoy it. Great article!

  4. Tony November 25, 2013 / 2:01 pm

    Sherman is an intriguing character, but I have become less and less a fan of his treatment of subordinates and prowess on the tactical offensive over the years. I remember this being hashed out amongst the usual suspects over the years, but can someone remind me of the criticisms of Sherman’s execution of the assault on tunnel hill (where is Joseph Rose when you need him)? 🙂

    • Joshism November 25, 2013 / 8:46 pm

      Sherman failed to occupy all of the northern portion of Missionary Ridge on the evening of Nov 24th, only seizing was is now called Lightburn Hill. Then on Nov 25th he attacked piecemeal against Cleburne’s troops rather than using his superior numbers.

      In Sherman’s defense, Cleburne did an outstanding job of using the terrain to his advantage and that terrain limited how Sherman could attack.

      There are two good essays in the Chattanooga book (the one with Brooks’ essay on the Grant-Thomas Orchard Knob controversy) regarding Sherman, Cleburne, and Tunnel Hill.

    • jfepperson November 27, 2013 / 8:54 am

      Name not that name! 😉

      There are numerous examples of Sherman’s poor battlefield management. He could well have trapped much of Hood’s army in Atlanta in the Battle of Jonesboro, and he let Hardee escape from Savannah.

    • Joseph Rose December 6, 2013 / 6:05 pm

      . . . criticisms of Sherman’s execution of the assault on tunnel hill (because you asked).

      Off the top of my head and just on the 24th, Sherman made the following mistakes:
      Began crossing the Tennessee about two hours late
      Had troops entrench twice before advancing
      Superintended bridge construction instead of readying his advance
      Advanced much too slowly (it was supposed to be a “dash”)
      Didn’t utilize Long’s cavalry
      Didn’t utilize any of Howard’s infantry, except what was presented to him
      Didn’t aim directly at Tunnel Hill
      Didn’t advance with his troops
      Stopped before the troops reached the objective
      Entrenched once again
      Misinformed (or had Dana do it for him) Grant as to his situation

      He was even worse on the 25th.

  5. Don November 25, 2013 / 5:43 pm

    Wonderful example of how commanders and their plans may be important factors in explaining the outcome of battles, but are far from the sole determinants. The quality, character, and aggresiveness of subordinants and troops is critical, as well.

  6. TFSmith November 25, 2013 / 8:22 pm

    Seems like a reasonable chronology of what is a confusing action, and certainly fits in terms of Grant’s and Thomas’ personalities, and the basic requirement of Occam’s Razor.


  7. Joshism November 25, 2013 / 8:40 pm

    “What’s important, however, is what [fill in the blank] thought was happening at the time” is probably one of the most important things to understand history, especially military history.

  8. M.D. Blough November 25, 2013 / 9:45 pm

    I think the discipline and firepower of Cleburne’s men created the false but quite reasonable impression in the Union troops facing them that there had to be a lot more Confederate troops there than there actually was. It’s somewhat similar to the impression that Berdan’s Sharpshooters created on Oates’ men at Gettysburg.

    I suppose that no one who is a fierce advocate of any Union general will ever admit that it was a series of mostly happy accidents for the Union and not genius on anyone’s part. It also helped that Braxton Bragg was unfortunate in so many ways. The man was the human equivalent of fingernails on a blackboard. The people who deserved the credit and the praise were the men of the Army of the Cumberland who, when faced with the choice of what to do when the rifle pits proved an untenable position, chose to claw their way up Missionary Ridge

    • hankc9174 November 26, 2013 / 1:41 pm

      were the rifle pits truly untenable? they are mostly protected from above and darkness was falling…

  9. Noma November 26, 2013 / 12:50 pm

    Speaking of Braxton Bragg, who most everyone, North and South, counts as a fool. Why did Sherman love him?

  10. Ned B November 27, 2013 / 6:04 am

    Some reactions:

    1. I disagree that Grant’s plan that morning was for Sherman to land the decisive blow. The orders to Sherman and Thomas issued during the night don’t indicate that Sherman’s attack is to be any more decisive than Thomas’s.

    2. There were Confederates shifting to the right flank that morning. The divisions of Stevenson and Cheatham had been ordered to reinforce Cleburne. Stevenson started reached Cleburne at daylight, Cheatham followed and eventually was in reserve behind. So its not just what Grant thought was happening, it was actually happening. By midday Bragg had sent more than 1/2 his army to his right to hold off Sherman (Divisions of Cleburne, Walker, Cheatham, Stevenson +Lewis’s brigade). Using just the divisions of Anderson, Bate and Stewart to man the rest of the line all the way to Rossville meant the line was thinly held in front of Thomas.

    3. Seems to me that Thomas was more interested in Hooker’s movement becuase Hooker was under his direction.

    4. The orders from the night before showed that Grant had already considered the option of Thomas attacking the ridge, so I dont see that this was a new mission but rather finally getting Thomas involved with implementing Grant’s plan from the night before.


    8. As far as I can tell, the appearance of Hooker only had an impact on those forces (two brigades from Stewart’s division) that were at his end of the ridge.

  11. Rob in CT November 27, 2013 / 10:24 am

    The only book I’ve read about Chattanooga was “The Shipwreck of Their Hopes” by Peter Cozzens. He’s awfully harsh concerning the screwups of basically everyone involved, but particularly Bragg, Longstreet, Hooker and Sherman.

    It’s just the sort of book for one who believes wars are won by the side that makes the fewest mistakes.

    Anyone, your account of the assault on Missionary Ridge is a near perfect match for what I took away from the book.

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